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Abstract
We examine how immigrant employment enhances trade at the firm level using
unique administrative matched employer-employee data from Canada. We augment a
standard model of firms’ export market entry and sales decisions with trade costs that
depend on destination-specific immigrant employment at the firm level. We estimate
simple structural equations derived from the model that relate destination-specific
exporting decisions to immigrant employment. We develop a method to deal with the
potential endogeneity of immigrant employment that exploits the optimality conditions
associated with the firm’s employment decision. We find positive and statistically
significant effects of firm level immigrant employment on exporting. These effects vary
with product type and immigrant employee characteristics in ways consistent with the
idea that immigrant employees alleviate information barriers to trade.
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1 Introduction
Firms face considerable barriers to engaging in international trade. A large literature has
documented the importance of trade barriers and trade costs implied by aggregate data
(e.g., Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004) and by firm-level exporting behavior (e.g., Das,
Roberts and Tybout, 2007). In addition to overcoming physical and policy-related barriers,
firms spend resources to acquire information about destination markets.1 Immigrants may
play a key role in overcoming information barriers by sharing knowledge about their home
country or acting as intermediaries between firms, as argued, for example, in Rauch (2001).
Since Gould’s (1994) pioneering study with US aggregate data, a trade-creation effect of
immigrants—immigration from a particular country increases trade with that country—has
been documented extensively using aggregate or regional trade data and immigrant stocks
in different countries.2
In this paper, we use Canadian employer-employee matched data to analyze the trade-
creation effect of immigration at the firm level, i.e., immigrants from a particular country
employed by a Canadian firm increase that firm’s exports to the country. We use firm-
level data in order to complement the aggregate evidence on the trade-creation effect of
immigrants and shed light on the mechanisms behind this effect. If immigrant workers
provide the kind of information on their home countries suggested in the literature, then
they should be reducing trade barriers more for their employers than they do nationwide.
While the aggregate or regional immigrant stocks used in previous studies are useful
proxies for the information that immigrant networks provide to firms, the impacts of
immigrants on trade volumes should be observable in individual firms’ trade with their
1Information frictions are highlighted in, for example, Allen, 2014, Head and Mayer, 2013, and Steinwen-
der, 2018
2Examples include Head and Ries (1998) for Canada, Combes, Lafourcade and Mayer (2005) for France,
Girma and Yu (2002) for the UK, and Peri and Requena-Silvente (2010) for Spain. Felbermayr, Grossmann
and Kohler (2015) provide a survey of the literature.
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own immigrant employees’ home countries.
We use a unique administrative dataset compiled from tax, customs, and immigration
records by Statistics Canada (the national statistical agency) that matches all Canadian
workers to their firms. This dataset links firms to their export transactions by desti-
nation and product, and links immigrant workers to their country of origin and other
demographic characteristics. These data give us a comprehensive view of the immigrant
composition of employees in Canadian firms and these firms’ exporting decisions by
destination. This is the first paper to use these data, which provide an ideal setting to
study the trade-creation effect of immigrants at the firm level.
We guide our empirical analysis of the trade-creation effect of immigrants with a
standard model of export entry and sales decisions by firms, augmented to include a
role for immigrant employment in these decisions. In our model, firms face idiosyncratic
demand and fixed costs of exporting to each destination, as well as a variable trade
cost that depends on the firm’s number of immigrant employees from that destination.
The model yields simple structural equations relating a firm’s export sales and entry
decisions by destination to its domestic sales, its immigrant employment, and observable
destination-specific characteristics. We estimate versions of these equations by sector
(homogeneous and differentiated) and including different characteristics of immigrant
employees (education, earnings, age at arrival, and immigration entry category—i.e.,
skilled worker, family, business, or refugee).
We find that, across Canadian firms and export destinations, firms with more immigrant
employees from a country are more likely to export to that country, and have higher sales
there conditional on exporting, even after controlling for firm size and a set of standard
gravity-type destination characteristics. For example, a firm that employs one immigrant
from a country has a 4 percent higher probability of exporting to that country and 26
percent higher export sales conditional on exporting there than a firm with the same
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domestic sales but zero immigrants from that country.
We use two dimensions of the data – product type and immigrant employee characteris-
tics – to provide evidence for the idea that immigrants play a role in alleviating information
frictions in trade. When restricted to homogeneous goods (those traded on exchanges or at
reference prices) as opposed to differentiated goods, the effects of immigrant employment
on export entry and sales are much smaller (and insignificant for sales conditional on
entry). This finding is consistent with the idea, suggested by Rauch (2001) and Rauch and
Trindade (2002), that information barriers are less important for homogeneous goods than
for differentiated goods. Moreover, the relationship between immigrant employment and
exporting is accounted for primarily by immigrants who are highly educated; are above
median earnings within their firm; arrived to Canada as adults rather than as children;
and arrived in any immigration entry category other than refugee status. These findings
support the idea that skilled / recent immigrants (who are not fleeing persecution) are
more likely to have useful connections to, and knowledge of, their home country.
In estimating the firm-level entry and sales equations derived from our model, an
endogeneity issue arises if firms know their destination-specific idiosyncratic demand
before making employment decisions. Knowing that immigrants from a certain country
reduce trade costs to sell there, a firm might hire more immigrants from a destination to
which it is more profitable to export because of higher demand, and sell more exports
there for the same reason. To the extent that this is true, direct estimates of the model’s
entry and sales equations are biased upward.
We develop a novel approach to address this endogeneity issue by exploiting additional
implications of the model derived from firms’ optimal employment decisions. We adapt an
approach from the literature on estimating production functions that yields a relationship
between the share of revenues paid to immigrant employees from each country and the
marginal product of labor plus the elasticity of the variable trade cost for exporting to that
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country.3 This method addresses the endogeneity issue through the additional restrictions
implied by the optimality of firm’s employment choices. Using this method, we find
effects of immigrant employment on export sales that are smaller in magnitude than, but
qualitatively similar to, those derived from estimates of the export sales equation.
We also consider an alternative instrumental variable (IV) approach, instrumenting for
immigrant employment at the firm level with lags of itself. Lagged employment is a valid
instrument if previous immigrant employment is correlated with current immigrant em-
ployment, but not with innovations to demand that drive current export status and export
sales.4 We find IV estimates of the sales and entry equations using lagged employment to
be very similar to the OLS estimates.
This paper is related to a growing recent literature contributing to understanding the
links between migrant networks and international trade flows. Since the work of Gould
(1994) augmenting gravity equations with immigrant stocks using aggregate US data,
researchers have taken several approaches to overcome identification and endogeneity
issues with aggregate data. Most closely related to our paper are studies using matched
worker-firm datasets from different countries: Hiller (2013), Hatzigeorgiou and Lodefalk
(2016), Andrews, Schank and Upward (2017), and Marchal and Nedoncelle (2017). The
first three of these (using Danish, Swedish, and German data, respectively) use IV methods
and Marchal and Nedoncelle (2017) (with French data) uses propensity score matching
methods. Relative to these papers, we introduce a novel method based on previously
unexplored implications of firms’ immigrant employment decisions, we provide evidence
that the trade-creation effect varies with immigrant characteristics in ways consistent with
3Essentially, we use an index number method, versions of which date back to Solow’s (1957) use of
input cost shares to identify production function elasticities. Recent generalizations and applications of this
method include Gandhi, Navarro and Rivers (2018), De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), De Loecker et al.
(2016), and Blum et al. (2018).
4Lagged immigrant employment is among the set of instruments used in previous studies on immigration
and trade using matched employer-employee data, including Hiller (2013), Hatzigeorgiou and Lodefalk
(2016), and Andrews, Schank and Upward (2017).
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the idea that immigrants reduce information barriers, and we analyze newly created data
for Canada.
Another set of papers uses aggregate or regional data and draws on specific events that
resulted in exogenous variation of immigrant locations. These include refugee resettlement
(Parsons and Ve´zina, 2018 and Steingress, 2018), the location of Japanese internment camps
in the US in the 1940s (Cohen, Gurun and Malloy, 2017), and the timing of the opening
of the Swiss labor market to the rest of Europe (Ariu, 2019). In another vein, Peri and
Requena-Silvente (2010), Bastos and Silva (2012), and Burchardi, Chaney and Hassan (2017)
rely on the exogeneity of historically determined migrant stocks with respect to current
international transactions (exports in the first two studies and foreign investment in the
last). Relative to these papers, we use immigrant employment at the firm level rather than
regional or national immigrant stocks to isolate the trade-creating effects that immigrants
provide directly to firms.
Understanding the role of immigration in facilitating trade has important policy impli-
cations. A key aspect of a developed countries’ immigration policy is to use immigration
to assist firms in overcoming their labor and skill shortages.5 Policymakers also expend
effort on encouraging domestic firms’ exports.6 Our analysis of the firm-level effects of
immigrant employment on exporting behavior show that these goals are interdependent,
and the effects of immigration policies or export-promotion policies should take into
account the dependence between the two.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data sources
and document some patterns in immigrant employment and firm exporting in Canada.
In Section 3, we lay out the theoretical framework and derive equations relating export
5For example, the Temporary Foreign Worker Program in Canada and the H-1B Program in the United
States enable employers to hire foreign workers to fill labor and skill shortages.
6For example, Export Development Canada and the United States Commercial Service are government
agencies that exist to promote international trade.
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market entry and sales to immigrant employment, as well as the optimality condition
from the firm’s input choice decision. The estimation results are in Section 4, and Section 5
concludes.
2 Data
We use a unique matched employer-employee dataset for Canada that links firms to export
transactions and links immigrant employees to their immigration records, to quantify
the trade-creation effects of immigrant employment at the firm level. In this section, we
describe the data sources and provide some summary statistics on the relationship between
immigrant employment and exporting.
2.1 Data Sources
Our dataset is compiled from four Canadian administrative data sources: the National
Accounts Longitudinal Microdata File (NALMF), Trade by Exporter Characteristics (TEC),
personal tax files (T1), and the Longitudinal Immigration Database (IMDB). The first
two (NALMF and TEC) cover all incorporated Canadian firms, the T1 data cover all
individual tax-filers in Canada, and the IMDB includes all temporary and permanent
residents who immigrated to and filed taxes in Canada. The linkage environment that
matches workers and firms across these datasets is collectively referred to as the Canadian
Employer-Employee Dynamics Database (CEEDD).7
The NALMF provides information on payroll, revenues, employment, and NAICS
industry classification at the firm level. The TEC is compiled from customs transaction-
level data, and provides annual firm-level export sales by destination country and product
7The data are accessed at the Canadian Centre for Data Development and Economic Research (CDER)
within Statistics Canada in Ottawa.
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category at the 8-digit Harmonized System (HS8) classification. We concord the HS8
classification with 4-digit SITC codes so that we can quantify the the trade-creation effect
of immigrant employment across differentiated and homogeneous products according to
the Rauch (1999) classification.8
For all individual tax-filers in Canada, the T1 tax returns provide information on
employment income and allow us to link employees to firms. In addition, the IMDB
provides additional information for all immigrants to Canada since 1980 and filed at least
one tax return since 1982. The IMDB includes information on country of birth, last country
of residence, level of education, and entry class (family, business, refugee, etc.). Our linked
dataset constructed from these administrative sources provides a comprehensive account
of Canadian firms’ immigrant employment by source country and their export market
entry and sales by destination country.
2.2 Sample of Interest
We restrict our analysis to an unbalanced panel of manufacturing firms that operated
between 2010 to 2013, which are all the years for which export data are available.9 The
data contains 52,421 unique firms of which 18,151 have positive export sales to at least one
of the 226 countries in our sample during the four year period.
We restrict our sample to firms in the manufacturing industry for three reasons. The
first reason is to connect to previous literature on the trade-creation effect of immigrants,
which has focused on manufacturing exports. Second, manufacturing exports account
for over 50 percent of Canada’s exports for the period 2010-2013. Finally, the number
8Our trade data includes exports but not imports for each firm. An additional channel by which
immigrant employment could increase trade at the firm-level is by increasing imports of intermediate inputs
(see Ariu, 2019).
9For one result below, we use multi-year lags of immigrant employment at each firm, for which we link
employee data to firms going back to 2007.
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of firm-country pairs beyond manufacturing becomes computationally unmanageable.
Even restricting the sample to manufacturing firms, the data contain over 30 million
firm-destination-year observations.
We define an exporting firm as a firm that exported to at least one country during the
four year period 2010-2013. Exporting firms are on average larger than non-exporting
firms: average employment in exporting firms is 104 workers whereas in non-exporting
firms it is only 14. This employment disparity also exists for immigrant employment: on
average exporting firms employ 24 foreign-born workers whereas non-exporting firms
only employ 3. The most likely export destination for a Canadian manufacturing firm is,
unsurprisingly, the United States, with over 30% of exporting firms exporting to the U.S.
Table 1 shows the top 15 source countries for immigrant employment during the 2010-
2013 time period. India, the Philippines and China make up the top three source countries
for employment in the manufacturing industry. These countries also top the list of source
countries of recent immigrants.10
2.3 Patterns in immigrant employment and exporting
Here we provide a first look at the degree to which employment of immigrants from
a country is associated with exporting to that country across Canadian manufacturing
firms. Figure 1 plots the percentage of firms with positive immigrant employment that
export (vertical axis) against the percentage of all firms that export, by immigrant source
/ export destination country. For example, about 17 percent of manufacturing firms that
employ German immigrants export to Germany, while 3.5 percent of all manufacturing
firms export to Germany (the point labelled “DE” in the figure). The entire mass in the
figure is above the 45-degree line, meaning that for every country in the world, Canadian
10Statistics Canada, Immigrant population in Canada, 2016 Census of Population.
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firms that employ immigrants from that country are more likely than average to export
there.
In Figure 2, we look at the analogous relationship between immigrant employment
and a measure of export sales conditional on exporting, comparing the average export
ratio (export sales relative to domestic sales) for firms employing immigrants and for all
firms, by country. The figure shows that firms with immigrant employees export a higher
than average proportion of their sales to the immigrant employees’ home countries. For
example, across all firms that export to China, the average export ratio is 1.3 percent,
while the average export ratio among firms exporting to China that also employ Chinese
immigrants is about 4 percent.
From Table 2 we see that the relationship between immigrant employment and export-
ing holds across the firm-size distribution, with the relative magnitude larger for small
firms. For example, across all countries, a firm in the 1st (bottom) revenue quartile with
positive immigrant employment from a particular country is about 14 times more likely
to export to that country than a firm that does not employ immigrants from that country
(0.57%÷ 0.04%). For the 4th (top) revenue quartile, there is still a pronounced difference,
but the ratio falls to a factor of 6 (8.61%÷ 1.45%).
Taken together, these findings suggest that there is a strong relationship between firm-
level employment of immigrants from a particular destination country and exports to that
country, both through the extensive margin of entry into the destination as well as the
intensive margin of the volume of export sales there conditional on entry. In addition, this
positive relationship between immigrant employment and exporting holds across the size
distribution of firms. In Section 3 we outline a theoretical framework that specifies a firm’s
trade costs as a function of its immigrant employment, and yields structural equations that
we use to estimate the trade-creation effect of immigrant employment at the firm level.
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3 Theoretical framework
In this section, we lay out a model that specifies how firm-level immigrant employment
affects trade costs, and thereby firms’ export entry and sales decisions across destinations.
We then derive equations that we use to estimate the effect of immigrant employment on
exporting.
3.1 Technology, Demand, and Trade Costs
A continuum of monopolistically competitive firms, indexed by i, each produce a unique
good using labor. Firm i’s labor productivity is φi. Countries are indexed by k = 1, . . . , K.
We label Canada as country 1, and given our data, we consider the decisions of Cana-
dian firms only. Firms decide on whether to export to each country, and conditional on
exporting, how much to sell.
There is a representative consumer in each country k that consumes a CES bundle,
Qk =
(∫
Ωk
α
1
σ
ikq
σ−1
σ
ik di
) σ
σ−1
(1)
where Ωk is the set of goods available in country k, qik is the quantity of good i consumed
in country k, the elasticity of substitution is σ > 1, and αik is a firm- and country-specific
demand shock that is i.i.d. across firms and countries. Following standard steps, demand
for good i in country k is given by:
qik = αikQk
(
pik
Pk
)−σ
(2)
where the price index Pk is given by Pk =
(∫
Ωk
p1−σik αikdi
)1/(1−σ)
. In terms of expenditures
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xik = pikqik,
xik = p1−σik αikEk (3)
where Ek =
Qk
P−σk
is an index of market demand in country k.
In order to sell to each foreign destination, a firm faces fixed and variable trade costs. A
firm’s variable cost of exporting to destination k depends on the number of immigrants
from k employed at the firm. Fixed costs fik are idiosyncratic across firms. Letting Nik
denote the number of immigrants from country k employed at firm i, firm i has to pay an
iceberg cost τk(Nik) per unit of goods shipped to country k. We let Ni = ∑k Nik denote firm
i’s total employment.
We assume that variable costs, but not fixed costs, depend on firms’ immigrant em-
ployment, because our empirical approaches would only identify the sum of the effects
of immigrants on the two costs. The summary statistics in Section 2 strongly suggest
that both the intensive margin (sales conditional on exporting) and the extensive margin
(positive or zero exports) depend on a firms’ immigrant employment by destination. For
this reason, we put the dependence on immigrant employment in the variable cost, since
this accounts for both observations. By contrast, if only fixed costs, and not variable costs,
depend on immigrant employment, then export entry decisions would be correlated with
immigrant employment, but export sales conditional on entry would not.
3.2 Export sales and export entry
With the model outlined above, we first derive implications for export sales and export
entry decisions when firms take as given the source-country composition of their employ-
ees. This approach provides a useful benchmark because it yields firm-level analogues of
the immigrant-augmented aggregate gravity equations used in, e.g., Gould (1994), Head
and Ries (1998), and Peri and Requena-Silvente (2010). Taking into account firm-level em-
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ployment decisions, however, leads to an endogeneity problem not present with aggregate
data, which we address in section 3.3.
Firms take as given the wage, w, and choose their prices to maximize profits taking as
given the demand function (2). This leads to the standard constant markup over marginal
cost,
pik =
σ
σ− 1
wτk(Nik)
φi
Conditional on exporting to country k, firm i’s export sales there are given by
xik =
(
σ
σ− 1
wτk(Nik)
φi
)1−σ
αikEk
Using the analogous expression for domestic sales, xi1 =
(
σ
σ−1
w
φi
)1−σ
αi1E1, we can write
firm i’s sales to country k, xik, as:
xik = xi1τk(Nik)1−σα˜ikE˜k (4)
where α˜ik = αik/αi1 and E˜k = Ek/E1.
In logs, equation (4) is:
log xik = log xi1 + (1− σ) log τk(Nik) + log E˜k + log α˜ik (5)
Firm i exports to country k if the variable profits from doing so exceed the fixed cost fik.
Profits from exporting to k are piik = xik/σ, so firm i exports to k if xik ≥ σ fik. Using the
indicator Ξik to denote if firm i exports to k,
Ξik =

1 if xi1τk(Nik)1−σα˜ikE˜k ≥ σ fik
0 otherwise
(6)
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As a probabilistic statement, equation (6) can be written:
Pr(Ξik = 1) = Pr
(
log xi1 + (1− σ) log τk(Nik) + log E˜k + log α˜ik − log(σ fik) ≥ 0
)
(7)
Equations (5) and (7) provide two implications on the effects of immigrant employment
on trade costs, through the intensive and extensive margins of exports. If the trade cost
for exporting to country k as a function of immigrants employed from k, τk, is decreas-
ing, equation (5) shows that firm i’s export sales to k increase with its employment of
immigrants from k, controlling for size through its domestic sales xi1. Similarly, equation
(7) shows that the probability of firm i exporting to k increases with its employment of
immigrants from k.
3.3 Endogeneity of Immigrant Employment
In our data, we observe firm-level market entry decisions (Ξik for k = 2, . . . , K), sales
by destination conditional on entry, including domestic sales (xik for k = 1, . . . , K), and
immigrant employment by source country (Nik for k = 2, . . . , K). Using destination
country-level proxies for E˜k and a given functional form for the trade cost τk, the only
unobserved variables in equations (5) and (7) are α˜ik and fik.
If Nik were exogenous, i.e. orthogonal to α˜ik, then we could estimate the effect of
Nik on τk (and thereby on export entry and sales decisions) by OLS on equation (5), or
by using a Probit or linear probability model (LPM) on equation (7). However, if firms
observe (at least part of) αik before making their hiring decisions, we would expect that
Nik is correlated with α˜ik across firms for a given destination, and across destinations for
a given firm. For example, if firm i observes a particularly high realization of αik, then
it is particularly profitable for that firm to export to k. If the firm knows that employing
immigrants from k lowers the costs of exporting to k (i.e. ∂τk∂Nik < 0), then it will increase Nik,
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so that Nik and α˜ik would be positively correlated. In this case, OLS estimation of equation
(5) and Probit or LPM estimation of equation (7) yield upward-biased estimates of the
effects of immigrant employment on both the intensive and extensive margins of exports.
Here we describe a novel approach to dealing with this endogeneity issue, motivated
by methods prevalent in the literature on estimating production functions. This approach
makes explicit use of firms’ optimal immigrant hiring decisions and the additional re-
strictions these decisions impose on the relationship between export sales and immigrant
employment. We also discuss an alternative instrumental variable (IV) approach using
lagged immigrant employment at the firm-level. In section 4, we compare estimates of
equations (5) and (7) that assume exogeneity of immigrant employment with these two
alternative methods.
3.3.1 Exploiting firms’ optimal employment decisions
Our approach for addressing the endogeneity of immigrant employment is to exploit
additional restrictions implied by firms’ optimal employment decisions. We derive an
equation from the firm’s first-order conditions that relates immigrant workers’ wage
payments to the elasticity of the variable trade cost with respect to immigrant employment,
by destination. The restrictions implied by optimal behavior yield an estimating equation
free from the endogeneity issue associated with equations (5) and (7), allowing us to replace
the unobserved αik with observables. This approach is similar to index number methods
in the estimation of production functions, as in Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982).
Recent papers that use variants of index methods to estimate either production functions
or markups include Gandhi, Navarro and Rivers (2018), De Loecker and Warzynski (2012),
De Loecker et al. (2016), and Blum et al. (2018).
We write the firm’s problem in terms of labor input choices, by first inverting country
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k’s demand for firm i’s output from equation (2):
q−1/σik (αikEk)
1/σ = pik (8)
Letting yik = τk(Nik)qik denote the quantity that firm i has to produce in order to sell qik to
country k, Firm i’s sales to country k are xik = pikqik, or:
xik =
(
yik
τk(Nik)
) σ−1
σ
(αikEk)1/σ (9)
We can view firm i’s profit maximization problem in two stages: given total output yi,
choose outputs {yik}k=1,...,K and entry decisions {Ξik}k=1,...,K to maximize total revenues
Xi. Then, choose labor inputs {Nik}k=1,...,K to maximize profit given how total revenues
vary with input choices. With sales to each country given by equation (9), total revenues
Xi given total output yi is:
Xi =max{yik}
∑
k
Ξiky
σ−1
σ
ik τk(Nik)
1−σ
σ (αikEk)1/σ
s.t. ∑
k
Ξikyik ≤ yi
As shown in the appendix, the maximized value of total revenues is
Xi = y
σ−1
σ
i
(
∑
k
ΞikαikEkτk(Nik)1−σ
)1/σ
(10)
To write the profit maximization problem, we assume that firm i’s production technol-
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ogy is11:
yi = φi∑
k
Nik (11)
so with total revenues given by (10), the profit maximization problem is:
max
{Nik,Ξik}k
(
φi∑
k
Nik
) σ−1
σ
(
∑
k
ΞikαikEkτk(Nik)1−σ
)1/σ
− w∑
k
Nik −∑
k
Ξik fik
Conditional on Ξik = 1, the first-order condition for Nik is:
w =
σ− 1
σ
y−
1
σ
i φi
(
∑
j
ΞijαijEjτj
(
Nij
)1−σ) 1σ
+ y
σ−1
σ
i
1
σ
(
∑
j
ΞijαijEjτj
(
Nij
)1−σ) 1σ−1
αikEk (1− σ) τk (Nik)−σ ∂τk (Nik)∂Nik (12)
As shown in the appendix, firm i’s sales to country as a fraction of total revenues, xikXi , can
be written:
xik
Xi
=
τk (Nik)
1−σ αikEk
∑j Ξijτj
(
Nij
)1−σ
αijEj
(13)
so that the first-order condition for Nik can be written:
wNik =
σ− 1
σ
Xi
Nik
Ni
+ xik
1− σ
σ
∂ log τk (Nik)
∂ log Nik
(14)
Equation (14) shows how we can infer the effects of immigrants on trade costs from
observed employment and sales. In the absence of an effect of immigrants on τ, (i.e. if
∂τk(Nik)
∂Nik
= 0), equation (14) states that payments to workers from country k as a fraction of
11Our derivations are the same if we generalize the technology to yi = φi(∑k Nik)θm
1−θ
i , where mi consists
of other inputs used by firm i and θ ∈ (0, 1) has constant returns to scale. In Appendix 6.2, we also consider
a version of the model in which immigrants’ labor productivity differs by source country. The estimates of
the elasticity ∂ log τk(Nik)∂ log Nik from this version are similar to our findings below.
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firm i’s revenues would equal the product of labor compensation’s total share of revenues,
σ−1
σ , times the fraction of employees from country k,
Nik
Ni
. This is the familiar condition
that, with perfect competition for inputs, the share of revenue paid to an input equals the
elasticity of revenue with respect to that input.
With trade costs that depend on the number of immigrant employees (i.e. ∂τk(Nik)∂Nik < 0),
the revenue elasticity of immigrant employees from each country now consists of the part
directly due to the production of output as well as the effects of increasing revenues through
reducing trade costs. The wage payments firm i makes to immigrants from country k above
σ−1
σ
Nik
∑j Nij
are compensation for the marginal increase in revenues associated with reduced
trade costs for exporting to country k, ∂ log τk(Nik)∂ log Nik . This reduction increases payments to
workers from k in a way proportional to firm i’s sales to country k, xik, since the variable
trade cost reduction applies to each unit of sales.
Equation (14) does not suffer from the same endogeneity issues as equations (5) and
(7). This is because equation (13) allows us to replace the unobserved residual αik in the
original first order condition (12) with the observed share of sales to country k, xikXi .
3.3.2 An instrumental variables approach
An alternative approach to addressing the endogeneity issue present in estimating equa-
tions (5) and (7) is to use instruments for country-specific immigrant employment at the
firm level. To implement this approach, we use as instruments three years of lags of Nik,
with the logic that past immigrant employment is correlated with current immigrant em-
ployment by country, but uncorrelated with current country-specific shocks to demand.12
12An additional instrument used in firm-level studies such as Hiller (2013), Hatzigeorgiou and Lodefalk
(2016), and Andrews, Schank and Upward (2017) is the stock of immigrants from a country employed by all
other firms in a firm’s region or industry. This instrument is meant to proxy for an exogenous supply of
immigrant workers from a certain country that varies across firms only through the exclusion of that firms’
immigrant employment. Here, we use only the lagged instrument, which generates firm-level variation
directly through firms’ own past decisions.
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A potential shortcoming of using lagged employment as an instrument is that firms may
make employment decisions several years in advance to prepare for exporting, as ar-
gued, for example, in Molina and Muendler (2013). We include results from instrumental
variables estimation of the sales and entry equations (5) and (7) in section 4 below.
4 Empirical Findings
In this section, we use the firm-level data described in Section 2 to estimate the effect
of immigrant employment on firm exporting behavior. We report estimates based on
equations (5) and (7) without and with the instruments described in section 3.3.2, and
estimates of the first-order condition, equation (14). Throughout, we assume that the
variable and fixed trade cost take the forms:
τk(Nik) = exp(κ′τDk)× gτ(Nik) (15)
fik = exp(κ′f Dk)× ηik (16)
where ηik is i.i.d. across firms and countries, and β′τDk and β′f Dk are linear combinations
of a vector of country k’s characteristics, Dk, that proxy for distance from Canada. We
include observables in Dk drawn from the gravity literature: geodesic distance between
country k’s most populous city and Canada’s (Toronto), and dummy variables that specify
whether country k is landlocked, has English as an official language, and shares a Free
Trade Agreement (FTA) with Canada. The function gτ is common across countries, and is
given by:
gτ(Nik) = (1+ Nik)−ετ (17)
This assumption on the shape of gτ has two convenient properties. First, gτ(0) = 1, so a
firm that hires zero immigrants from a particular country faces a finite destination-specific
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fixed and variable export cost for exporting to that country.13 Second, the percentage re-
duction in the variable trade costs from adding an additional immigrant worker declines as
the number of immigrant workers increases, which is intuitive: hiring one more immigrant
worker from country k at a firm with 20 employees from k should have a smaller effect on
its costs of exporting to country k than at a firm with only two immigrant employees from
k, all else equal. In particular, the semi-elasticity of the variable trade cost with respect to
Nik is
∂ log τk(Nik)
∂Nik
= −ετ1+Nik , which is decreasing in absolute value in Nik.
With these assumptions on τk, equation (5) can be written:
log xik = β0 + β1 log xi1 + β2 log(1+ Nik) + β′DDk + log E˜k + vik (18)
where β2 = (σ− 1)ετ, βD = (σ− 1)κτ, and vik = log α˜ik. We add the constant β0 so that
vik has mean zero, and we allow the coefficient on domestic sales, β1 to differ from 1.
Similarly, the version of equation (7) for the entry decision that we estimate is:
Pr(Ξik = 1) = Pr
(
γ0 + γ1 log xi1 + γ2 log(1+ Nik) + γ′DDk + log E˜k + uik > 0
)
(19)
where γ2 = (σ− 1)ετ, γD = (σ− 1)κτ − κ f , and uik = log α˜ik − log ηik.
Finally, we divide the first order condition (14) by total revenues and add a constant
and an error term to write it as:
wNik
Xi
= δ0 + δ1
Nik
Ni
+ δ2
xik
Xi
Nik
1+ Nik
+ ζik (20)
where δ1 = σ−1σ and δ2 =
σ−1
σ ετ. In estimating equations (18) and (22), we use destination
GDP and GDP per capita as proxies for E˜k. We estimate all three equations with year,
13This would not be the case if, for example, gτ(Nik) = N
−ετ
ik , in which a large number of firms would
face infinite costs to export to a large number of countries, since most firms have zero immigrant employees
from most countries.
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province, and industry fixed effects.
4.1 Benchmark estimates of the export sales and entry equations
In the first column of Table 3, we report OLS estimates of equation (18). The table shows a
significant relationship between employment of immigrants from country k and export
sales to country k. Conditional on a firm exporting to country k, the percentage change in
export sales to k from hiring one more immigrant worker from there, ∂ log xik∂Nik , is equal to
β2
1+Nik
. Therefore, the first column of the table shows that, for example, for a firm exporting
to k with no employees from k, adding one employee from k is associated with an increase
in export sales to k by 26%, while the increase for a firm with 10 employees going to 11
employees from k is 2.6%.14
The first column of Table 4 contains estimates of the effect of immigrant employment
on firms’ export market entry decisions, from linear probability estimation of equation (22).
The coefficient of immigrant employment on the probability of exporting is positive and
significant at the 1% level. Hiring one immigrant from country k at a firm that employs
zero raises the probability of exporting to country k by 3.9%.
In both Tables 3 and 4, the coefficients on domestic sales are of the expected sign: larger
domestic sales are associated with a higher probability of exporting to each destination
and higher sales conditional on exporting. The coefficients on the gravity variables are
also of the expected signs: distance reduces the probability of exporting and export sales
while shared language, free trade agreements, and larger destination market raise entry
probability and export sales.
14For comparison, Hatzigeorgiou and Lodefalk (2016), using a specification with a constant semi-elasticity
of export sales to immigrant employment, finds that an additional immigrant from country k is associated
with 3.6% higher export sales to country k.
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4.1.1 Differences across homogeneous and differentiated goods
As argued by Rauch (1999) and Rauch and Trindade (2002), information barriers are likely
to be more important for differentiated goods than for homogeneous goods, since the
latter are sold on organized exchanges or at reference prices. If immigrants reduce the
information barriers to export to their home countries, we should see a distinction in the
effects of immigrant employment on homogeneous and differentiated export sales.
To evaluate this difference in our data, we estimate sector-specific version of equations
(18) and (22). Letting s = (h, d) denote a sector (homogeneous, differentiated), we allow the
demand elasticity, σs, the destination demand shocks αsik, the trade cost function parameter,
εsτ, and the fixed cost f sik to vary by sector. The sector-specific version of equations (18) and
(22) are:
log xsik = β
s
0 + β
s
1 log x
s
i1 + β
s
2 log(1+ Nik) + β
s ′
D Dk + log E˜k + v
s
ik (21)
Pr(Ξsik = 1) = Pr
(
γs0 + γ
s
1 log x
s
i1 + γ
s
2 log(1+ Nik) + γ
s ′
D Dk + log E˜k + u
s
ik > 0
)
(22)
where Ξsik and x
s
ik are the firm i’s exporting decision for sector-s goods and sales of sector-s
goods conditional on entry in country k. Given that we do not observe sector-specific
proxies for market demand, we assume that market demand for each sector is proportional
to total market demand, so that total destination GDP and GDP per capita proxy for market
demand in each sector, E˜sk.
We define homogeneous and differentiated categories according to the Rauch (1999)
classification: homogeneous goods are those traded on organized exchanges or at a
standardized reference price, and differentiated goods are all others.15
The second and third columns of Table 3 report estimates of equation (21) for ho-
15We use the UN concordance to map the HS8 product categories in the data to the 4-digit SITC classi-
fication upon which Rauch (1999)’s classification is based, and we use the “conservative” version of the
classification, which minimizes the number of SITC product categories classified as homogeneous.
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mogeneous and differentiated goods separately. The estimates show that immigrant
employment has a positive, significant effect on export sales of differentiated goods. For a
firm exporting to k with no employees from k, adding one employee from k raises export
sales of differentiated goods to k by 28%. The effect for homogeneous goods’ export
sales is much smaller, and is not statistically significant. The second and third columns
of Table 4 shows that a similar pattern holds for entry decisions. Hiring one immigrant
from country k at a firm that employs zero is associated with an increased probability
of exporting differentiated goods to country k by more than three times the amount of
exporting homogeneous goods, 3.5% to 1% respectively.
The differences that we find in the effects of immigrant employment on exports of
differentiated and homogeneous goods support the idea that immigrants play a role for
their employers in alleviating information frictions associated with international trade.
4.2 First-order-condition and IV estimates
Given the potential endogeneity concerns outlined in section 3.3, in this section we present
results from our two alternative methods that address the endogeneity of immigrant
employment. Table 5 contains estimates of equation (20), derived from the first order
condition of the firms’ optimization problems, and Table 6 contains instrumental variables
estimates of the sales and exporting equations (18) and (22).
The first column of Table 5 shows the estimates of the first order condition, and
the second and third column contain the estimates for homogeneous and differentiated
goods separately. The estimated coefficient on the interacted term xikXi
Nik
1+Nik
is positive
and significant, at about 0.009. From equation (20), this coefficient corresponds to σ−1σ ετ
in the model, while the estimates on log(1 + Nik) in Table 3 correspond to (σ− 1)ετ, so
comparing the two requires a value for σ. We consider a range of values for σ motivated
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by empirical findings in the literature. For example, Broda and Weinstein (2006) estimate
elasticities of substitution for 10-digit HS product categories, finding a mean elasticity of
12 and a median elasticity of 3. For σ in the range [3,12], the estimate of 0.009 would yield
a range of σ× .009 = [0.027, 0.107] for the value of the coefficient β2 in the export sales
equation (18). These results indicate that, for example, for σ = 12, at a firm that exports to
country k but has zero immigrant employees from k, hiring one employee from k raises
export sales there by 10.7%. Therefore, the effect of immigrant employment on exports
estimated from the first order condition method is smaller than that from OLS estimation
of the exprot sales equation, but is still positive and significant. The second and third
columns of Table 5 contain estimates of equation (20) for homogeneous and differentiated
goods. As with the OLS estimates of the sales equation in Table 3, the implied effect of
immigrant employment is stronger for differentiated goods than for homogeneous goods.
Our second approach to deal with the endogeneity issue is to estimate the sales and
entry equations instrumenting for immigrant employment with its lags. Table 6 contains
the results. Using three years of lags of firm-level immigrant employment as instruments,
we find a positive and significant effect of immigrant employment on firm export sales
for all goods, and for both homogeneous goods and differentiated goods separately.
Moreover, the point estimates are very close to the OLS estimates from Table 3. From
the results in Tables 5 and 6, we conclude that addressing the endogeneity of immigrant
employment in firms’ exporting decisions both with our new approach based on optimality
of immigrant employment decisions and a conventional IV method yield positive and
significant estimates of the trade-creation effect of immigrant employment at the firm
level. In addition, all our estimates show a pronounced difference between exporting
behavior for homogeneous and differentiated goods, lending support to the idea that
immigrant employment alleviates information barriers that are more prevalent in the trade
of differentiated goods.
24
4.3 Heterogeneity in immigrant characteristics
In this section, we use the detailed data on immigrants’ characteristics to shed additional
light on the mechanisms by which immigrant employment affects firms’ exporting behav-
ior. We evaluate whether the strength of the trade-creation effect of immigrant employment
varies with observable immigrant characteristics which are likely to proxy for differences
in immigrant employees’ connections to their home countries and positions within their
employers in Canada. For example, high-skilled, highly paid immigrants may contribute
more to reducing trade barriers for their employers than low-skilled, low paid immigrants.
In addition, recent immigrants or those who immigrated as adults may have stronger
ties to their home country than those who arrived as children or in the distant past. We
also compare immigrants based on their immigration entry class. For example, due to
persecution in their home country, refugees are less likely to maintain contacts useful to
their Canadian employer compared to skilled workers or family-based immigrants.
We incorporate immigrants’ characteristics by assuming that the trade cost function for
exporting to country k, τk, depends on the composition of immigrant employees, along
different decompositions. Let G = {1, . . . , G} denote a partition of immigrants along
a single attribute (e.g. G ={High skill, Low skill} or G ={Arrived as child, Arrived
as adult}) and let Ngik denote the number of immigrants from country k within group
g = 1, . . . , G employed by firm i. Firm i’s variable cost of exporting to country k is then
τk(N1ik, . . . , N
G
ik ). Instead of the functional form (17), we assume the part of trade costs that
depends on immigrant employment is given by g(N1ik, . . . , N
G
ik ) = ∏g(1+ N
g
ik)
−εgτ , so that
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the analogues of equations (5) and (7) are
log xik = log xi1 + (1− σ)β′τDk + (σ− 1)∑
g
ε
g
τ log(1+ N
g
ik) + log α˜ik + log E˜k (23)
Pr(Ξik = 1) = Pr
(
log xi1 + ((1− σ)βτ − β f )′Dk + (σ− 1)∑
g
ε
g
τ log(1+ N
g
ik) (24)
+ log E˜k + log α˜ik > 0
)
We consider different partitions G based on characteristics that reflect how much
influence an immigrant employee is likely to have within their firm and how connected an
immigrant is likely to be to their home country. These attributes are: (1) earnings (above
or below median earnings within the firm); (2) education at time of arrival (college or no
college); (3) age at arrival (adult or youth, i.e. above or below 18); (4) time since arrival
(less than or greater than 10 years); and (5) immigration entry category (skilled worker,
family, investor, refugee, or other).16
In Table 7 we report OLS estimates of equation (23) for the first four immigrant group
partitions described above. The table shows that the effect on export sales conditional on
entry is more strongly associated with the number of immigrants employees who are in
the top half their firm’s earnings distribution (NAMik ), have attended college (N
HS
ik ), arrived
as adults to Canada (NAik ), and arrived more recently (N
<10
ik ). These findings are consistent
with the idea that immigrants decrease information frictions to export their home country.
For example, age at arrival is particularly important: for a firm exporting to country k with
no employees from k, adding one employee who emigrated from k as an adult raises export
sales to k by about 24%, while hiring an employee who arrived as a youth is insignificant.
Presumably, an immigrant arriving in Canada as an adult has had the time to acquire the
16Relative earnings within the firm serves as a proxy for occupation, which we do not observe. The
rationale for using this proxy is that employees who affect production and sales decisions are likely higher
up in a firm’s earnings distribution.
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knowledge and contacts in their home country that would make them valuable in reducing
trade barriers for their employer in Canada.
In Table 8 we explore the importance of immigrant entry class on the strength of the
trade creation effect for export sales. As expected, since refugees have weak links to their
home country, we find that employment of refugees does not increase exports to their
home country. On the other hand, family, investment, and skilled worker class immigrants
all increase export sales to their home country. Our finding that employment of refugees is
negatively associated with exports to their home country is consistent with the aggregate
evidence for Canada in Head and Ries (1998).
Table 9 reports the effects of employment of different immigrant groups on firms’
export entry decisions, from LPM estimation of equation (24). Similar to the results on
export sales in Table 7, we find that firms’ employment of immigrants who: are high
skilled; arrived to Canada as adults; are in the top half of a firm’s earnings distribution; or
arrived more recently, is more strongly associated with entry. For example, hiring one high
skilled employee who emigrated from country k at a firm with no high skilled employees
from country k raises the probability of exporting to k by 6.25%, compared to only 1.07%
for a low skilled employee.
In Table 10 we report the effects of employment of different immigrant entry categories
on export market entry. Employment of investor class immigrants leads to the highest
increase in export participation for a firm, followed by the skilled class and family class
immigrants. Hiring one immigrant from country k at a firm that employs zero, raises the
probability of exporting to country k by 7.8%, 5.9%, or 2.3%, for investment, skilled, or
family class immigrants respectively. Employment of refugees is associated with a small
negative effect on firm export entry to the refugees’ home country.
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5 Conclusion
In this study, we have added to the literature on the relationship between immigrant
employment and exporting behavior at the firm-level using a novel administrative matched
dataset of Canadian manufacturing firms and immigrant employees. Our results suggest
that there is a positive, significant effect of immigrant employment on firms’ export market
entry and sales decisions. To address a potential endogeneity issue, we adapt an approach
from the literature on production function estimation, based on the first-order condition of
the firms’ optimal immigrant employment decisions.
We exploit detailed data on product categories and individual immigrant characteristics
in our linked employer-employee data to evaluate the heterogeneity of the trade-creation
effect across immigrants. For example, highly educated, highly paid immigrants have a
larger impact on increasing firm export sales relative to low skilled immigrants. Canada’s
immigration policy, one that encourages and emphasizes skilled and entrepreneurial immi-
grants, has therefore presumably contributed to the trade-creation effect at the aggregate
level. Both skilled and investment class immigrants have strong positive effects on expand-
ing existing export sales and increasing export participation to country k for firms that hire
them. Our results provide a better understanding of how firms utilize their immigrant
workforce to facilitate international trade, and could be useful in better measuring the
overall impact of migration on the welfare of native-born workers. A fruitful extension
along these lines would be to embed our model into a more general framework that
jointly accounts for the various effects of immigrants on native-born workers through the
labor market. In addition, given that firms are likely making hiring decisions with future
export decisions in mind (as argued in, for example, Molina and Muendler, 2013), a future
theoretical contribution would be extending our framework to a dynamic setting.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Firm Exporting and Immigrant Composition
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
% of firms exporting, by destination
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
%
 o
f f
irm
s 
em
pl
oy
in
g 
im
m
ig
ra
nt
s 
th
at
 e
xp
or
t t
o 
th
ei
r h
om
e 
co
un
try
, b
y 
de
st
in
at
io
n
AE
AR
AT
AU
BB
BD
BE
BG
BR
CH CL
CN
CO
CU
CZ
DEDK
DO
DZ
EC
EG
ES
FI FR
GB
GH
GT
GY
HK
HR
HU
IDIE
IL
IN
IQIR
IT
JM
JP
KR
KW
KZLB
LK
MA
MX
MY
NG
NL
NZ
PE
PH
PK
PL
PTRO
RU
SA
SE
SG
SK
SV
TH
TR
TT
TW
UA
UY
VE
VN
ZA
33
Figure 2: Average Export Sales and Immigrant Composition
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Table 1: Top Immigrant Source Countries
Country Immigrants Employed
India 194,328
Philippines 174,688
China 135,669
Vietnam 105,657
Sri Lanka 52,330
Poland 51,396
Romania 34,714
Guyana 34,359
Hong Kong 33,280
United Kingdom 32,684
Pakistan 26,648
Jamaica 26,181
El Salvador 22,037
Russia 19,352
Haiti 19,219
Notes: Employment numbers for manufacturing
firms using the sample pooled from 2010-2013
Table 2: Firm Exports by Revenue Quartile
With Immigrant Employment Without Immigrant Employment
Revenue Quartile Positive Exports Flows Positive Exports Flows
1 0.57% 0.04%
2 1.01% 0.14%
3 2.26% 0.38%
4 8.61% 1.45%
An observation is a firm-country pair pooled over the time period 2010-2013. The with immigrant
employment column shows the percentage of exporting firms that export to country k conditional
on having immigrant employment from country k.
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Table 3: OLS estimates of export sales equation
Dependent variable: Log exports of:
All Homogeneous Differentiated
goods goods goods
log(xi1) 0.359*** 0.313*** 0.335***
(0.004) (0.012) (0.005)
log(1+ Nik) 0.262*** 0.0425 0.285***
(0.017) (0.039) (0.018)
log distance -0.393*** -0.343*** -0.367***
(0.011) (0.038) (0.012)
English 0.224*** 0.086 0.218***
(0.016) (0.057) (0.018)
Landlocked -0.062* -0.621*** -0.008***
(0.032) (0.129) (0.034)
FTA 0.193*** 0.306*** 0.179***
(0.025) (0.087) (0.026)
log GDP 0.251*** 0.245*** 0.239***
(0.005) (0.015) (0.005)
log GDP per capita -0.004 -0.201*** 0.009***
(0.007) (0.043) (0.008)
Firm-destination obs. 190,155 33,011 171,741
Adjusted R2 0.262 0.333 0.227
Notes: The table contains estimates of equation (18) in the text, from data pooled
for all firms, destination countries, and years. All regressions include a constant
and year, province, and industry fixed effects. xi1 is firm-level domestic sales. Nik
is firm-level immigrant employment by destination. Distance measures geodesic
distance to destination country’s most populous city. English equals 1 if destina-
tion has English as an official language and 0 otherwise. Landlocked equals 1 if
destination is landlocked and 0 otherwise. FTA equals 1 if destination has a free
trade agreement with Canada and 0 otherwise. GDP and GDP per capita are for the
destination. Robust standard errors clustered by firm-country are in parentheses.
Significance denoted by * (10%), ** (5%), and *** (1%).
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Table 4: LPM estimates of export participation equation
Dependent variable: Indicator of positive exports of:
All Homogeneous Differentiated
goods goods goods
log(xi1) 0.0034*** 0.0008*** 0.0029***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
log(1+ Nik) 0.0390*** 0.0101*** 0.0347***
(0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0006)
log distance -0.0149*** -0.0038*** -0.0390***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
English 0.0131*** 0.0029*** 0.0121***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Landlocked 0.0019** 0.0006*** 0.0019**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
FTA 0.0193*** 0.0043*** 0.0180***
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
log GDP 0.0045*** 0.0009*** 0.0041***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
log GDP per capita -0.0009*** -0.0003*** -0.0008***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Firm-destination obs. 30,089,6945 30,089,694 30,089,694
Adjusted R2 0.051 0.015 0.047
Notes: The table contains estimates of equation (22) in the text, from data pooled
for all firms, destination countries, and years. All regressions include a constant and
year, province, and industry fixed effects. xi1 is firm-level domestic sales. Nik is firm-
level immigrant employment by destination. Distance measures geodesic distance to
destination country’s most populous city. English equals 1 if destination has English as
an official language and 0 otherwise. Landlocked equals 1 if destination is landlocked
and 0 otherwise. FTA equals 1 if destination has a free trade agreement with Canada
and 0 otherwise. GDP and GDP per capita are for the destination. Robust standard
errors clustered by firm-country are in parentheses. Significance denoted by * (10%), **
(5%), and *** (1%).
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Table 5: OLS estimates of the employment first order condition
Dependent variable: wNikXi , wage share of immigrants by destination
All Homogeneous Differentiated
goods goods goods
Coefficient on NikNi 0.228*** 0.230*** 0.228***
(0.0104) (0.0103) (0.0104)
Coefficient on xikXi
Nik
1+Nik
0.0089*** -0.0086 0.0123***
(0.0012) (0.0055) (0.0024)
Firm-destination obs. 192,018 192,018 192,018
Adjusted R2 0.554 0.553 0.554
Notes: The table contains estimates of equation (20) in the text, from data pooled for
all firms, destination countries, and years. All regressions include a constant and
year, province, and industry fixed effects. xik is firm-level export sales, Xi is total
firm revenues, Nik is firm-level immigrant employment by destination, and Ni is
firm-level total employment. Robust standard errors clustered by firm-country are in
parentheses. Significance denoted by * (10%), ** (5%), and *** (1%).
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Table 6: IV estimates of export sales equation
Dependent variable: Log exports of:
All Homogeneous Differentiated
goods goods goods
log(xi1) 0.3452*** 0.2919*** 0.3263***
(0.0046) (0.0831) (0.0049)
log(1+ Nik) 0.2775*** 0.0854** 0.2954***
(0.0184) (0.0238) (0.0198)
log distance -0.4088*** -0.3618*** -0.3843***
(0.0116) (0.0398) (0.0123)
English 0.2342*** 0.1380*** 0.2210***
(0.0169) (0.0360) (0.0180)
Landlocked -0.0393 -0.5148*** 0.0072
(0.0333) (0.0542) (0.0349)
FTA 0.1944*** 0.3140*** 0.1791***
(0.0249) (0.1257) (0.0265)
log GDP 0.2491*** 0.2278*** 0.2406***
(0.0046) (0.0123) (0.0049)
log GDP per capita 0.0051 -0.1424*** 0.0158**
(0.0074) (0.0148) (0.0079)
Firm-destination obs. 181,082 31,314 163,796
Adjusted R2 0.272 0.398 0.237
Notes: The table contains instrumental variables estimates of equation (18) in the
text, from data pooled for all firms, destination countries, and years. All regressions
include a constant and year, province, and industry fixed effects. xi1 is firm-level
domestic sales. Nik is firm-level immigrant employment by destination. Instruments
for log(1+ Nik) are 3 lags of itself. Distance measures geodesic distance to destina-
tion country’s most populous city. English equals 1 if destination has English as an
official language and 0 otherwise. Landlocked equals 1 if destination is landlocked
and 0 otherwise. FTA equals 1 if destination has a free trade agreement with Canada
and 0 otherwise. GDP and GDP per capita are for the destination. Robust standard
errors clustered by firm-country are in parentheses. Significance denoted by * (10%),
** (5%), and *** (1%).
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Table 7: OLS estimates of export sales equation of immigrant groups
Dependent variable: Log exports
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(1+ NAMik ) 0.272***
(0.028)
log(1+ NBMik ) 0.042
(0.027)
log(1+ NHSik ) 0.228***
(0.028)
log(1+ NLSik ) 0.111***
(0.026)
log(1+ NAik ) 0.241***
(0.021)
log(1+ NYik) 0.063
(0.042)
log(1+ N<10ik ) 0.221***
(0.028)
log(1+ N>10ik ) 0.136***
(0.024)
log(xi1) 0.363*** 0.363*** 0.361*** 0.362***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
log distance 0.393*** 0.394*** 0.393*** 0.393***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
English 0.227*** 0.229*** 0.226*** 0.228***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Landlocked -0.065*** -0.064*** -0.063*** -0.063***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
FTA 0.192*** 0.188*** 0.190*** 0.188***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
log GDP 0.254*** 0.252*** 0.253*** 0.252***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
log GDP per capita -0.011 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Firm-destination observations 190,155 190,155 190,155 190,155
Adjusted R2 0.262 0.262 0.262 0.262
Notes: The table contains estimates of equation (23), from data pooled for all firms, destination countries, and
years, for different partitions of immigrant employees. All regressions include a constant and year, province,
and industry fixed effects. xi1 is firm-level domestic sales. N
g
ik is firm-level employment of immigrants from a
particular destination in group g. Immigrant groups for each regression are: (Column 1) AM=Above Median
Earnings, BM=Below Median Earnings; (2) HS=College Educated, LS=Non College Educated; (3) A=18
years of age or older at arrival, Y=below 18 years of age at arrival; (4) <10 = Less than 10 years since arrival,
>10 = Greater than 10 years since arrival. Distance measures geodesic distance to destination country’s
most populous city. English equals 1 if destination has English as an official language and 0 otherwise.
Landlocked equals 1 if destination is landlocked and 0 otherwise. FTA equals 1 if destination has a free trade
agreement with Canada and 0 otherwise. GDP and GDP per capita are for the destination. Robust standard
errors clustered by firm-country are in parentheses. Significance denoted by * (10%), ** (5%), and *** (1%).
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Table 8: OLS estimates of export sales equation with immigrant entry class
Dependent variable: Log exports
log(1+ NSkilledik ) 0.083***
(0.029)
log(1+ NFamilyik ) 0.315***
(0.035)
log(1+ N Investmentik ) 0.214***
(0.069)
log(1+ NRe f ugeeik ) -0.213***
(0.048)
log(1+ NOtherik ) 0.086
(0.065)
log(xi1) 0.364***
(0.0044)
log distance -0.394***
(0.011)
English 0.210***
(0.017)
Landlocked -0.056*
(0.033)
FTA 0.189***
(0.025)
log GDP 0.255***
(0.005)
log GDP per capita -0.016**
(0.007)
Firm-destination observations 190,155
Adjusted R2 0.262
Notes: The table contains estimates of equation (23), from data pooled for all firms, destination countries,
and years, for the entry class partition of immigrant employees. The regression includes a constant and
year, province, and industry fixed effects. xi1 is firm-level domestic sales. Ncik is firm-level employment of
immigrants from a particular destination in entry class c. Distance measures geodesic distance to destination
country’s most populous city. English equals 1 if destination has English as an official language and 0
otherwise. Landlocked equals 1 if destination is landlocked and 0 otherwise. FTA equals 1 if destination
has a free trade agreement with Canada and 0 otherwise. GDP and GDP per capita are for the destination.
Robust standard errors clustered by firm-country are in parentheses. Significance denoted by * (10%), **
(5%), and *** (1%).
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Table 9: LPM estimates of export participation by immigrant groups
Dependent variable: Indicator of positive export sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(1+ NAMik ) 0.0376***
(0.0009)
log(1+ NBMik ) 0.0185***
(0.0008)
log(1+ NHSik ) 0.0625***
(0.0012)
log(1+ NLSik ) 0.0107***
(0.0006)
log(1+ NAik ) 0.0327***
(0.0006)
log(1+ NYik) 0.0326***
(0.0016)
log(1+ N<10Yearsik ) 0.0306***
(0.0009)
log(1+ N>10Yearsik ) 0.0304***
(0.0008)
log(xi1) 0.0034*** 0.0035*** 0.0034*** 0.0035***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
log distance -0.0149*** -0.0150*** -0.0149*** -0.0149***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
English 0.0131*** 0.0131*** 0.0131*** 0.0131***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Landlocked 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0019***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
FTA 0.0192*** 0.0192*** 0.0192*** 0.0192***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
log GDP 0.0046*** 0.0045*** 0.0046*** 0.0045***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
log GDP per capita -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0009***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Firm-destination observations 30,089,694 30,089,694 30,089,694 30,089,694
Adjusted R2 0.050 0.052 0.050 0.050
Notes: The table contains estimates of equation (24), from data pooled for all firms, destination countries, and
years, for different partitions of immigrant employees. All regressions include a constant and year, province,
and industry fixed effects. xi1 is firm-level domestic sales. N
g
ik is firm-level employment of immigrants from a
particular destination in group g. Immigrant groups for each regression are: (Column 1) AM=Above Median
Earnings, BM=Below Median Earnings; (2) HS=College Educated, LS=Non College Educated; (3) A=18
years of age or older at arrival, Y=below 18 years of age at arrival; (4) <10 = Less than 10 years since arrival,
>10 = Greater than 10 years since arrival. Distance measures geodesic distance to destination country’s
most populous city. English equals 1 if destination has English as an official language and 0 otherwise.
Landlocked equals 1 if destination is landlocked and 0 otherwise. FTA equals 1 if destination has a free trade
agreement with Canada and 0 otherwise. GDP and GDP per capita are for the destination. Robust standard
errors clustered by firm-country are in parentheses. Significance denoted by * (10%), ** (5%), and *** (1%).
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Table 10: LPM estimates of export entry equation with immigrant entry class
Dependent variable: Indicator of positive export sales
log(1+ NSkilledik ) 0.0588***
(0.0013)
log(1+ NFamilyik ) 0.0228***
(0.0009)
log(1+ N Investmentik ) 0.0784***
(0.0052)
log(1+ NRe f ugeeik ) -0.0090***
(0.0009)
log(1+ NOtherik ) -0.0167***
(0.0019)
log(xi1) 0.0035***
(0.0000)
log distance to k -0.0150***
(0.0001)
English in k dummy 0.0130***
(0.0001)
k Landlocked dummy 0.0019***
(0.0000)
FTA with k dummy 0.0194***
(0.0002)
log GDP in k 0.0045***
(0.0000)
log GDP per capita in k -0.0009***
(0.0000)
Firm-destination observations 30,089,694
Adjusted R2 0.052
Notes: The table contains estimates of equation (24), from data pooled for all firms, destination countries,
and years, for the entry class partition of immigrant employees. The regression includes a constant and
year, province, and industry fixed effects. xi1 is firm-level domestic sales. Ncik is firm-level employment of
immigrants from a particular destination in entry class c. Distance measures geodesic distance to destination
country’s most populous city. English equals 1 if destination has English as an official language and 0
otherwise. Landlocked equals 1 if destination is landlocked and 0 otherwise. FTA equals 1 if destination
has a free trade agreement with Canada and 0 otherwise. GDP and GDP per capita are for the destination.
Robust standard errors clustered by firm-country are in parentheses. Significance denoted by * (10%), **
(5%), and *** (1%).
43
6 Appendix
6.1 Firms’ hiring decisions
To write the firm’s problem in terms of labor input choices, we start from output: for each
destination k to which firm i sells, to satisfy demand it must produce qik = τk (Nik) p−σik αikEk,
which can be inverted to:
(
qik
τk (Nik)
)−1/σ
(αikEk)
1/σ = pik
So revenues for firm i from selling to k are:
xik = pik
qik
τk (Nik)
=
(
qik
τk (Nik)
) σ−1
σ
(αikEk)
1
σ
To write the profit maximization problem in terms of labor inputs {Nik}k=1,...,K, first
take as given firm i’s total output yi, and solve for the quantities exported to each country
k, qik. Firm i allocates its sales to maximize revenues, taking as given the αik’s:
max
{qik}
∑
k
Ξikq
σ−1
σ
ik (τk (Nik))
1−σ
σ (αikEk)
1
σ
s.t. ∑
k
Ξikqik ≤ yi
The first order conditions for output produced for sale to k, qik, and output produced
for domestic sale, qi1, conditional on Ξik = 1, yield:
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σ− 1
σ
q
−1
σ
ik (τk (Nik))
1−σ
σ (αikEk)
1
σ = λi
and for domestic output:
σ− 1
σ
q
−1
σ
i1 (αi1E1)
1
σ = λi
So taking the ratio of these two,
qi1
αikEk
αi1E1
τk (Nik)
1−σ = qik (25)
Summing equation (25) across k and rearranging gives:
qi1
αi1E1
=
yi
∑k ΞikαikEkτk (Nik)
1−σ (26)
Using (25) and (26), we can write total revenues as:
∑
k
Ξikq
σ−1
σ
ik (τk (Nik))
1−σ
σ (αikEk)
1
σ =∑
k
Ξikq
σ−1
σ
i1
(
αikEk
αi1E1
τk (Nik)
1−σ
) σ−1
σ
(τk (Nik))
1−σ
σ (αikEk)
1
σ
=
(
qi1
αi1E1
) σ−1
σ
∑
k
ΞikαikEkτk (Nik)
1−σ
=y
σ−1
σ
i
(
∑
k
ΞikαikEkτk (Nik)
1−σ
) 1−σ
σ
∑
k
ΞikαikEkτk (Nik)
1−σ
=y
σ−1
σ
i
(
∑
k
ΞikαikEkτk (Nik)
1−σ
) 1
σ
(27)
Firm i’s production technology is yi = φi ∑k Nik, so with total revenues given by (27),
the profit maximization problem is:
max
{Nik}k
(
φi∑
k
Nik
) σ−1
σ
(
∑
k
ΞikαikEkτk (Nik)
1−σ
) 1
σ
− w∑
k
Nij −∑
k
Ξik fik
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Conditional on Ξik = 1, the first-order condition for Nik is:
0 =
σ− 1
σ
(
φi∑
j
Nij
) σ−1
σ −1
φi
(
∑
j
ΞijαijEjτj
(
Nij
)1−σ) 1σ
+
(
φi∑
j
Nij
) σ−1
σ 1
σ
(
∑
j
ΞijαijEjτj
(
Nij
)1−σ) 1σ−1
αikEk (1− σ) τk (Nik)−σ ∂τk (Nik)∂Nik
− w
Now substitute in yi and multiply by Nik throughout:
wNik =
σ− 1
σ
(yi)
σ−1
σ
Nik
∑j Nij
(
∑
j
ΞijαijEjτj
(
Nij
)1−σ) 1σ
+ (yi)
σ−1
σ
(
∑
j
ΞijαijEjτj
(
Nij
)1−σ) 1σ αikEkτk (Nik)1−σ
∑j ΞijaijEjτj
(
Nij
)1−σ 1− σσ ∂τk (Nik)∂Nik Nikτk (Nik)
Now, the factor αikEkτk(Nik)
1−σ
∑j ΞijαijEjτj(Nij)
1−σ is the share of sales to k, since the foc’s from above for
any j, k give:
qijτk (Nik)
1−σ αikEk = qikτj
(
Nij
)1−σ
αijEj
So we can write the share of revenues from sales to country k as:
xik
∑j Ξijxj
=
(
qik
τk(Nik)
) σ−1
σ
(αikEk)
1
σ
∑j Ξij
(
qij
τj(Nij)
) σ−1
σ (
αijEj
) 1
σ
=
τk (Nik)
1−σ αikEk
∑j Ξijτj
(
Nij
)1−σ
αijEj
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So substitute in for revenues Xi and xik to write:
wNik
Xi
=
σ− 1
σ
Nik
∑j Nij
+
xik
Xi
1− σ
σ
∂ log τk (Nik)
∂ log Nik
6.2 Technology with productivity differences across countries
Here, we generalize the technology so that workers have different labor productivity that
differs across source countries. Firm i’s output is now
yi = φi∑
j
zjNij (28)
and workers from country j receive wage wj. The first-order condition is now:
wk =
σ− 1
σ
(
φi∑
j
zjNij
) σ−1
σ −1
φizk
(
∑
j
ΞijαijEjτj
(
Nij
)1−σ) 1σ
+
(
φi∑
j
zjNij
) σ−1
σ 1
σ
(
∑
j
ΞijαijEjτj
(
Nij
)1−σ) 1σ−1
αikEk (1− σ) τk (Nik)−σ ∂τk (Nik)∂Nik
which can be written:
wkNik =
σ− 1
σ
ri
zkNik
∑j zjNij
+
1− σ
σ
rik
∂ log τk (Nik)
∂ log Nik
(29)
This cannot be used exactly like equation (14) above, because ∑j zjNij is not observed.
Instead we rewite it as:
wkNik − 1− σσ rik
∂ log τk (Nik)
∂ log Nik
=
σ− 1
σ
ri
zkNik
∑j zjNij
(30)
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and divide by the equation for natives, Ni1, which is w1Ni1 = σ−1σ ri
z1Ni1
∑j zj Nij
,
wkNik − 1−σσ rik ∂ log τk(Nik)∂ log Nik
w1Ni1
=
zkNik
z1Ni1
(31)
and rearrange,
wkNik = w1Ni1
zkNik
z1Ni1
+
1− σ
σ
rik
∂ log τk (Nik)
∂ log Nik
(32)
With the assumption that τk(Nik) = eβ
′Dk(1+ Nik)−ε, the elasticity in the last term is:
∂ log τk (Nik)
∂ log Nik
= −ε Nik
1+ Nik
(33)
so the first-order condition with productivity differences is:
wkNik = w1Ni1
zkNik
z1Ni1
+ rik
σ− 1
σ
ε
Nik
1+ Nik
(34)
Equation (34) is linear in the parameter ε, so it can be estimated via OLS by proxying for
the term zkz1 with country fixed effects.
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